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Intentionally and Isomorphism in Aristotle
Christopher Shields
University of Colorado at Boulder
The parallel Aristotle forges between noêsis and aisthêsis fissures at the
seam of their material realizations: whereas the aisthêtikon has various
organs, the noêtikon has none. The brief reason Aristotle offers for this
disanalogy may seem initially quite unsatisfactory. To some, at any rate,
Aristotle's claim that nous lacks an organ comes to little more than a lowlevel empirical gaffe.1 He observes that the eyes, ears and other sense organs
play a central role in aisthêsis. Not detecting any such role for the brain or
other organ in noêsis, Aristotle supposes that nous lacks an organ altogether,
and infers that it is therefore separate and unmixed with the body (DA 429a2427,429M-5). Thus, his chain of inference leads rather haphazardly from a
dubious empirical finding to an extravagant philosophical thesis about the
nature of nous. One taking this approach might well conclude that since we
no longer suffer under the same impoverished empirical limitations, we can
safely set aside Aristotle's unfortunate conception of nous as immaterial, and
turn our attention to those features of his concept of mind more germane to
our own concerns.
Perhaps not many will agree with this simple, unflattering diagnosis of
Aristotle's motivation for regarding nous as in some sense immaterial. Still,
some things Aristotle claims might suggest such a motivation, including
especially his remarks about how nous would come to be qualified, perhaps
by being hot or cold, if it had an organ (DA 429b25-6). Moreover, if there is
general agreement that Aristotle does not reserve a special status for nous on
the basis of a misguided empirical belief, there is little agreement about the
genuine source of his reservation. Aristotle has some qualms about
regarding thinking and perception as directly analogous, even though the
same general account of form assimilation covers both. In this paper I
investigate one central source of Aristotle's dissatisfaction with a
comprehensive analogy between aisthêsis and noêsis. I will argue that his
conception of nous as organless is neither empirically motivated nor
1Wilkes (1978) typifies this approach. See also Hartman (1977).

obviously misguided. On the contrary, Aristotle's insistence that nous is
separate and unmixed with the body is grounded in an approach to
intentionality nascent in his treatment of noêsis.2 This approach to
intentionality helps motivate the special status he awards nous.
I. Nous is Unmixed with the Body
Perception and thinking are alike in that the same model of formreception covers both. In perception, as in thinking, some human faculty
receives a form in such a way that the relevant psychic capacity is affected in a
certain way (paschein ti).3 "If, then, thinking is just as perceiving <is>,"
Aristotle suggests, "<it will involve> a certain sort of being affected either by
the object of thought or something else of this sort" (DA 429al3-15). Aristotle
evidently endorses the antecedent of this conditional (DA 427a8, 431b28-32a3),
even though the analogy does not hold in all particulars. Indeed, Aristotle
had issued a warning to this effect earlier, in De Anima ii 5, where he
suggested that thinking is up to us in a way in which perception is not (see
especially 417M6-29, a passage which closes with a forward reference.
^This paper is drawn from a larger work, where I undertake a more general analysis
of Aristotelian intentionality; I do not attempt such an analysis in this paper.
Rather, I seek to ground the peculiar status Aristotle confers on nous in a plausible
central feature of his approach to the intentionality of the mental. For a
comprehensive, if problematic, account of Aristotelian intentionality, see Brentano
(1867/1977). I sketch some of the fundamental difficulties for Brentano’s account
below in § IV.
3With the locution paschein ti, Aristotle might intend one of three things, of which
only the first two have been recognized. If the indefinite ti is an accusative object of
paschein, Aristotle means (i) in thinking nous suffers something; if, by contrast, ti is
a noun agreeing with paschein, Aristotle means either (ii) thinking is a kind of
being affected, or (iii) thinking is a being affected—kind of (that is, thinking is akin
to being affected, but not quite a proper instance of it). See in addition to DA 429al4,
410a25,427a20, 427b2, and de Part. An. 641a36. The ambivalence expressed at DA
417b2-16, and esp. at b6-7 and b!5-16, suggests that Aristotle probably intends (iii).
Distinguishing between (i) and (ii) only, Hicks (1907, 292) thinks nothing much
turns on the matter; he explicates Aristotle's ambivalence merely in terms of
something's being affected by being annihilated by its opposite versus something's
being changed by having one of its potentialities preserved and perfected. Since (iii)
is a possibility, Aristotle's ambivalence may be more extreme: perhaps noêsis is not
a proper kind of being affected at all, even though it is explicable in terms of the
same principle of form receptivity operative in aisthêsis, where there is in every
case a genuine concomitant affection.

promising the sort of discussion DA iii 4 delivers). Nonetheless, Aristotle
holds that for both thinking and perception, it is at least necessary that the
relevant psychic faculty be affected in a certain way by its object. Hence,
without some form of interaction with an aisthêton, aisthêsis is impossible.
Similarly, subject to a possible qualification,4 without some formal
interaction with a noêton, noêsis will not occur.5
Even so, the general model of form-reception appropriate to both
aisthêsis and noêsis requires tailoring if it is to be applied more specifically to
the distinct psychic activities of perceiving and thinking. For nous is unlike
the perceptive faculty in that it is not mixed with the body. If perception
%
involves the reception of a sensible form without its matter (DA 417al0-27),
where this involves a certain organ's being informed in virtue of its being
affected by some aisthêton, then aisthêsis is at least initially explicable in
terms provided by Aristotle's standard model of hylomorphic change:
something potentially informed by F-ness comes to be actually informed by Fness in virtue of its suffering a certain process at the hands of some agent.6 Of
course, how this process is to be unpacked and understood is a matter of some
controversy; central to any discussion must be the question of whether the
sense organ's being affected in the appropriate way is sufficient for perception,
and if so, whether, more strongly, aisthêsis simply consists in such affection/
These difficult questions notwithstanding, the application of the hylomorphic
model of change to aisthêsis has some initial appeal—or at least as much
appeal as the hylomorphic model of change has generally.

^Some qualification may be necessary because of the perplexing rider that noêsis
occurs only if nous is affected in a certain way by a noêton or "something else of this
sort" (ti toiouton heteron; DA 429al4-15). The alternative dangled is somewhat
unclear, since although he is presumably worried about the mode of affection in
question, Aristotle may equally be concerned about the status of the noêton (or
noêta) required for individual acts of thinking.
^This claim should not be construed in such a way that it commits Aristotle to any
form of externalism about mental content. Thus far, Aristotle has said nothing
more than that thoughts must have contents; an inference to externalism would
require minimally a conception of noêta not accepted (or not obviously accepted) by
Aristotle. For a useful discussion of externalism, see McGinn (1989).
f>Here the terms of the analogy advanced in DA iii 4 make clear that the aisthêtikon
is affected hupo tou aisthêtou in an instance of aisthêsis.
?See Slakey (1961), Sorabji (1971), (1974), and (1992).

Already at this basic level, however, a difference between nous and the
aisthètikon emerges .89 What is potentially F in aisthêsis, what is available as
the material substrate, are the organs themselves/ In striking contrast, nous
is "none of the things existing in actuality before thinking" (outhen estin
energeia(i) prin noein; DA 429a24). Aristotle's peculiar contention in this
regard upsets the analogy he elsewhere endorses. Because nous is nothing in
actuality before thinking, it is hard to understand how the hylomorphic
analysis of change and affection could be brought to bear in this arena. When
some clay receives a form, a compound comes into being. When a sense
organ receives the form of the aisthêton, aisthêsis can occur. What receives
the form of the noêton? Nothing in actuality is potentially the form of the
noêton. More precisely, nothing called nous is in actuality and is such as to be
potentially the form of the noêton before actual thinking occurs. This entails
that before thinking there is either nothing in actuality capable of receiving
the form of the noêton, or that although there is something in actuality
capable of receiving the form, it is something other than nous itself. On the
first alternative, there is evidently nothing at all in actuality which then
suddenly exists in actuality at the moment of noêsis. On the second
alternative, there is something in actuality which is potentially the noêton
but (i) it is not nous before the moment of noêsis, or (ii) it never becomes, but
only engenders, nous at the moment of noêsis. Each of these possibilities
carries its own peculiarities. More importantly, every one of these
possibilities suggests an approach at odds with the analysis of aisthêsis, which
is given in terms of the hylomorphic model of change. Indeed such an
account of "being affected in a certain way" seems hardly amenable to the
hylomorphic model of change at all: where there is nothing antecedently to
be affected, it is hard to see how something is reasonably held to have been
affected in the course of noêsis. It is therefore difficult to appreciate how
Aristotle means to deploy the hylomorphic model in his analysis of noêsis, or
to understand why he has not simply overtaxed this model by trying to
implement it in a domain recalcitrant to its own requirements.89
8 Aristotle treats nous as parallel to the aisthètikon (as opposed to aisthêsis) in

several passages. See, e.g., 402bl3,410b22 and 429M7.
9This at any rate seems to be the implication of the first lines of DA ii 12, especially
424a24-26: "It is primarily the sense organ (aisthêtêrion) in which this capacity is
[that is, the capacity to receive sensible forms without matter]."

This initial lack of fit recommends a closer look at Aristotle's
motivation for distinguishing between noêsis and aisthêsis in the first place.
His motivation emerges, though none too clearly, in the following
compressed chain of inferences in De Anima iii 4:
Necessarily, then, since it thinks all things, nous is unmixed, just as
Anaxagoras says, so that it may rule—but this is so that it may come to
know. For something foreign interposing <itself> hinders and wards
<it> off, so that its nature is nothing other than this, that it is something
potential. Hence, the part of the soul called nous (I mean by nous that
by which the soul thinks and conceives) is none of the things existing ifli
actuality before it thinks. Wherefore neither is it reasonable <to say>
that it is mixed with the body; for then it would come to be qualified in a
certain way, either cold or hot, or would even have an organ, just as
there is for the perceptive faculty. But as it is, there is nothing (DA
429al8-27).
Central to this entire line of reasoning is Aristotle's contention that nous
thinks all things. Generally, since nous can take on any form, it must not be
so constituted that its own intrinsic nature would preclude its carrying out its
operation. I will refer to this claim as the Plasticity Requirement, which we
can set out as a first approximation as follows:
PR: Nous has no intrinsic feature capable of precluding its thinking
any given noêton.
Thus stated, PR is not equivalent to the striking claims (i) that nous is
nothing in actuality before thinking; (ii) that its nature consists in its being
potential; or (iii) that it is unmixed with the body. Nor does Aristotle suppose
that these claims are equivalent. He rather seeks to infer these doctrines
from PR, or from an argument in which PR serves as a central premise.
Consequently, whatever its ultimate credentials, Aristotle's contention
that nous is unmixed with the body is clearly not motivated in any direct way
by a bland empirical observation about the brain, heart, or other central organ.
On the contrary, the claim is that since it is nothing in actuality before
thinking, nous cannot be mixed with the body. Presumably, then, Aristotle
supposes that its being nothing in actuality provides sufficient grounds for
denying that nous is mixed with the body. Its not being qualified in any way
is not then adduced as independent evidence that it is not mixed with the

body. Rather, Aristotle adds this clause in order to shore up the inference
from:
(Pi) Before thinking, nous is none of the things which exist in actuality
to:
(C) Nous is not mixed with the body.
The structure of the argument seems to be:
(Pl) Before thinking, nous is none of the things which exist in
actuality.
(P2) If nous were mixed with the body, it would come to have some
quality or other, e.g. hot or cold.
(P3) Moreover, if nous were mixed with the body, it would (like the
aisthêtikon) have an organ.
(P4) If nous is none of the things which exist in actuality before
thinking, it cannot come to have some quality or have an organ.
(Ci) Hence, nous cannot come to have some quality or have an organ.
(C2) Hence, nous is not mixed with the body.
On this construal, Aristotle uses the observations about the possibility of
there being an organ for nous, or its being qualified in some way, as a bridge
to the conclusion that it is not mixed with the body. He does not even claim
independently in this context that nous lacks an organ or that it cannot be
qualified. Rather, he offers only the hypothetical claim (P4) that if it is
nothing in actuality before thinking, nous cannot have an organ or be
intrinsically qualifiable. Hence, since he does not advance the consequent of
(P4) as an independently verified premise, Aristotle cannot mean it to be
justified by some considerations beyond those given in the passage. Hence,
he cannot intend it to be justified on any empirical grounds, spurious or
otherwise.
That Aristotle's approach is a priori rather than empirical should on
reflection be unsurprising. Near the end of De Anima ii 1, Aristotle had
raised the possibility that some part of the soul might be separate, by
connecting the issue of separation with being an actuality (entelecheia) of a
body:
That the soul is not separate from the body—or some of its parts if it is
naturally partite—is not unclear. For the actuality of some of them is

<the actuality> of their appropriate bodily parts> .^ Still, nothing
prevents some of them <from being separates because of their being
the actuality of no body (DA 413a3-7; cf. 408al2,411M8).
Here Aristotle relates the soul's being separate from the body to its being the
actuality of a body. Something's being the actuality of the body is sufficient for
its not being separate, since Aristotle infers the non-separability of some parts
of the soul from their being the actuality of some bodily part. Moreover, so
long as something is not the actuality of a body, it may be separate from the
body. When Aristotle later seeks to infer the conclusion that nous is not
mixed with the body from its not being anything in actuality, we merely s^g
him re-affirming what he has said earlier by establishing the truth of a
narrower claim by grounding it in one which is more encompassing. If nous
is none of the things which exist in actuality before thinking, then, trivially, it
is not the actuality of any body, at any rate not before thinking.
This interpretation frees Aristotle of an ill-motivated empirical
grounding for a controversial philosophical thesis, but only by treating his
remarks about the possibility of there being an organ for nous, or its being
qualified in some way, as dependent on considerations pertaining to its
actuality rather than as independently motivated by observation.
Consequently, this interpretation may seem at odds with the clause which
follows immediately upon Aristotle's introduction of the possibility of there
being an organ for nous or its becoming qualified in some way. For he has
seemed to some to observe directly that there is no organ for nous. As he
says: nun d'outhen estin..= If Aristotle here simply asserts that there is no
organ for nous, then this vitiates my contention that he never offers the
claim that nous lacks an organ as an independent premise in the argument
And this is surely how he has been understood .11
Yet this is not Aristotle's point. He does not here simply assert that
nous lacks an organ. Rather, he underscores what he has said earlier, that
nous is none of the things which exist in actuality before it thinks. The
phrase nun d'outhen estin does not mean "but as a matter of fact it has

l^Here I suppose the inference requires eniôn to be taken closely with the meré tina
au tés at 413a4, while merôn estin autôn looks forward to the sômatos at 413a7.
ÏÏMany commentators have understood him this way; some views are collected by
Hicks (1907,482).

none "12 or "but as things are it has none ".13 It means, instead, "as it is, it is
nothing". When he claims that nous is none of the things existing in
actuality before thinking and infers that it is not mixed with the body,
Aristotle cements the inference by pointing out that if nous were the actuality
of anything at all, it would be the actuality of an organ. He then infers that it
is not mixed with the body, since it is not the actuality of any organ. Finally,
he punctuates the argument by reaffirming its driving premise, that nous is
nothing in actuality before thinking. Hence, this closing phrase does not
undermine the interpretation I have offered. On the contrary, it provides
additional support for the claim that nous, being nothing in actuality before
thinking, is hardly the actuality of any body; it is therefore not mixed with the
body.
II. Nous is Nothing in Actuality before Thinking
Aristotle argues that nous is unmixed with the body, because of its
being nothing in actuality before thinking. His ground provided here is apt to
bewilder us. If it is nothing in actuality before thinking, how does nous come
to be something when thinking? Does nous come to be something when
thinking? In either case, what would incline us to accept such a claim?
Aristotle himself does not introduce this thesis as obvious or as justified by
any simple appeal to our intuitions about nous. Rather he represents it as
itself an inference from a previous set of premises, as an interim conclusion
in a larger argument.14
This interim conclusion is evidently to be derived from PR, the claim
that nous lacks any intrinsic feature capable of hindering its thinking any
given noêton. Recall Aristotle's chain of inference to this point:
Necessarily, then, since it thinks all things, nous is unmixed,
just as Anaxagoras says, so that it may rule—but this is so that it
may come to know. For something foreign interposing
<itself> hinders and wards <it> off, so that its nature is nothing
other than this, that it is something potential. Hence, the part
of the soul called nous (I mean by nous that by which the soul
^H icks (1907,131)
l^Hamlyn (1968).
l^Note the ara at 429a22.

thinks and conceives) is none of the things existing in actuality
before it thinks (DA 429a 18-24).
Here Aristotle seeks to infer:
(C) Nous is nothing in actuality before thinking.
from:
(P) Nous thinks all things.
Unfortunately, the progress of his argument is not immediately obvious.
Perhaps Aristotle reasons as follows. Since it thinks all things, nous is
unmixed, in an Anaxagorean sense. The relevant fragments of Anaxagoras
do not tell us much about the sense of amigê Aristotle has in mind; and in
any case, Aristotle himself appropriates Anaxagoras' position rather
remorselessly by glossing hina kratê(i) as Hina gnôrizê(i) (429al9-20).15 As
unmixed, nous has no nature other than this: that it is potential. Lacking any
other nature, it is nothing in actuality before thinking.
If this is his point, we can represent Aristotle's argument as follows:
(PI) Nous thinks all things.
(P2) If it is to think all things, it is necessary that nous be unmixed.
(Cl) Hence, nous is unmixed.
(P3) If nous is unmixed, its nature must be nothing other than being
potential.
(C2 ) Hence, its nature is nothing other than being potential.
(P4) If its nature is nothing other than being potential, nous must be
nothing in actuality before thinking.
(C3) Hence, nous is nothing in actuality before thinking.
(C3) is, of course, simply that first premise of the argument whose conclusion
ultimately concerns us, that nous is not mixed with the body.
l^The relevant fragment is 12 D, where nous rules the rotation of the universe and
structures its temporal order. As I suggest in the text, the degree to which Aristotle
accepts anything substantive from Anaxagoras is unclear. What is clear is his
penchant for citing Anaxogoras in similar contexts, including DA 405a6. Some
insight into his fondness for Anaxagoras's conception of nous is provided by
Phys. 256b24, where Aristotle links being amigê to ruling in the way that nous is said
to rule. In this passage too, however, Aristotle molds and updates the Anaxagorean
nous for his own purposes. It is noteworthy in the Phys. Aristotle endorses the
inference from its ruling to its being amigê, without endorsing the antecedent of the
conditional, namely that nous rules. When he later supplants kratein with
gnôrizein, Aristotle evidently distances himself from Anaxagoras’ conception.
Brentano (1867/1977, 225 n. 14) rightly downplays the Anaxagoras' influence.

The move from (P4) to (C3) may seem obvious. If nous has no nature
other than being potential, surely it is nothing in actuality before thinking.
Yet this inference is not in all ways obvious. Surely something could be
potentially a mature member of the species—could have an unactualized
nature—without therefore being nothing in actuality. A boy is potentially a
mature member of his species, but is not actually so. Still, we should be hard
pressed to deny that the boy was something actual before growing to maturity.
At any rate, unless we meant something quite restricted by outhen estin
energeia(i) ton ontôn, we would be unlikely to insist that an immature boy
was nothing in actuality simply in virtue of his not being a fully actual
human being. Moreover, if we mean something quite restricted by tHis
phrase, then the claim that nous is nothing in actuality before thinking loses
all (or most) of its distinctiveness. For in this case it would mean simply that
nous is not thinking some actual thought before thinking, a claim with an air
of dreary triviality about it.
Presumably Aristotle intends the more distinctive claim. If so, when
he claims that it has no other nature than being potential, Aristotle supposes
as an ancillary hypothesis that nous has no actual characteristics which do not
pertain to its nature. For if nous has no nature other than being potential and
has no properties adhering to it beyond those which pertain to its very nature,
then Aristotle will be justified in moving from (P4) to (C3). He will,
moreover, have argued for the distinctive claim that we had expected.
There is a cost associated with this reconstruction. For now (C2) carries
more weight than it otherwise would have, and so is justifiably inferred from
(P3) only on a robust understanding of (Cl), the initial claim that nous is
amigê. This claim in turn is justified only if the initial premise, that nous
thinks all things, is suitably strong. It is therefore this first premise which
carries most of the weight of the entire argument sequence.

III. Nous Thinks All Things
When he claims that nous thinks all things, why does Aristotle not
claim something manifestly false? On the assumption (justified, I believe, by
429al0) that De Anima iii 4 concerns the human nows, then it is false that
nous thinks all things. A given human nous is limited in time and power,
and as Aristotle remarks elsewhere (EN x; Meta, xii), it is not the case that we
are always in a position to exercise nous. I think some things at some times;
at no time do I think all things; and even compiling all things I think
throughout my temporally-bounded life span, I hardly think all the noêta
there are to think. Indeed, compiling even all the thoughts of all the humans
who ever lived or will live, then, at least on some contruals of how we might
individuate noêta, it remains false that nous thinks all things.
If this is correct, then, Aristotle's contention must be something other
than the clearly false claim that nous thinks everything. It must rather be the
claim that there is no noêton which is such that it cannot be thought by nous.
This claim would implicate Aristotle in two others, corresponding to the
relata of a given instance of noêsis. The first concerns the structure of noêta:
SN: Every noêton must be such that it can be thought, in principle, by
an ideally rational human nous.
Second is a claim about the structure of human nous itself:
HN: An ideally rational human nous must be so structured that it can,
in principle, apprehend any given noêton.
The first claim speaks to features of Aristotle's metaphysical realism ,16 insofar
as it contends that the structure of the universe is such that it can be
apprehended. The second, co-ordinated claim speaks rather to the nature of
nous itself. Because of its consequences for the sense in which nous is
unmixed with body, I will focus on this second claim (HN).
It may seem that HN is also clearly false. It may seem, indeed, an
embarrassment for Aristotle, since once again empirical limitations make it
clear that a massively complex noêton could not be grasped by nous in the
span of a human life. (For example, perhaps the solution to the four-color
theorem would require so much raw computational power that no nous, no
matter how idealized, could contemplate it in the span of a life.) This may
l^On Aristotle’s metaphysical realism, see Irwin (1988, § 2).

simply indicate, however, that Aristotle's point is conceptual rather than
empirical in character. That is, he is not insisting that for any given noêton
there exists some human such that that human could in fact cognize that
noêton. Rather, he means to suggest only the weaker hypothesis that for any
given noêton, nothing about the intrinsic character of nous itself precludes its
being cognized. That is, he is making a point about the structure of nous and
the limitations that structure would place on its operations. And he is
claiming that it is possible that an ideally rational nous can think anything
intelligible. Putative noêta of infinite complexity, if there are such, present
no serious problem here, since empirical limitations do not undermine the
conceptual possibility Aristotle envisages.
Still, since Aristotle baldly asserts HN, we are entitled to wonder what
justification he has for it. The issue is pressing, since on the construal of his
overarching argument I have offered, HN is the only premise not inferred
from something else, and is thus the one premise whose truth cannot be
determined at least in part on the basis of inferential warrant. Of course,
Aristotle may simply take it as obvious; or he may have other reasons for
asserting it which are not recapitulated in this portion of the De Anima. In
either case, both the correctness and indeed the very character of Aristotle's
ultimate conclusion turn on this claim.
IV. The Genesis of Aristotle's Concern: Brentano
Thus far I have suggested negatively that Aristotle's concern in De
Anima iii 4 cannot be understood as flowing from a simple empirical error. I
have, moreover, suggested a direction for understanding his true concern.
Aristotle's argument is driven by what I have called PR, the plasticity
requirement, that nous has no intrinsic properties incompatible with its
thinking any given noêton. I am of course not alone in suspecting that
Aristotle's real motivation lies in some concern about the operation of nous.
Brentano famously held that Aristotle's reservations concerning nous stem
from peculiar features of noêta, features required to understand their
availability as objects of noêsis about which a given noêma could be .17
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano understood
Aristotle to be relying on a distinction between two ways a person might be
^Brentano 0874/1973).

said to take on a certain quality.18 In Brentano’s terminology, my hand is
physically cold when it takes on a measurable temperature lower than its
average. Even when my hand is physically cold, I may not perceive cold;
when I do, Brentano holds that I have taken on the coldness objectively. For
early Brentano, this follows directly from the thesis that every psychic state is
intentional in character, that is, that every psychic state is analyzable
relationally into act and object. Armed with this distinction, Brentano argues
that Aristotle's point at De Anima 429a24 must be as follows. Aristotle does
not mean that the mind's being mixed with the body in the sense of its
becoming physically cold would somehow interfere with its becoming
objectively cold; for clearly something can be both physically and objectively
cold, as indeed some person could be physically cold while being objectively
hot. Instead, if nous were mixed with the body, it would need to have some
particular quality objectively in each of its operations. That is, if mixed with
the body, nous would perforce have a special object in the way that each of the
senses does. Vet there is no special object for nous. It can think all things.
Therefore, nous is not mixed with the body.
Brentano's conjectural reconstruction merits consideration.
Something can be F in either of two ways. Let us translate from Brentano's
preferred idiom by saying that something can either exemplify or encode Fness.19 Some subject exemplifies F-ness when it instantiates F-ness in a
direct, non-metaphorical way. So, grass exemplifies greenness. By contrast,
something encodes F-ness when it represents F-ness without itself becoming
F in any direct or literal way. If I dream of a man in a yellow hat, some state
of my brain encodes the wearing of a yellow hat; no part of my brain wears a
hat, and no part of my brain becomes yellow. Representation generally may
encode rather than exemplify. A mental representation of Baudelaire does
not have a floppy mustache, and so does not exemplify the property of having
a floppy mustache. It may nevertheless encode this property in its
representation of Baudelaire. Brentano's point is not, as one would expect,
that if mixed with the body nous would necessarily exemplify some property,
^Brentano (1874/1973,80-89,112-148). The earlier Brentano (1867/1977,77-80, with
229 n. 23) is not quite as crisp.
l^On exemplification and encoding, see Zalta (1984) and (1988). See also Findlay
(1933) for a discussion Mally's (1912) distinction between erfilllen and
determinieren, which prefigures Zalta's exemplifying and encoding.

with the result that it would be hindered in its operations. (This might be
what one would expect him to make of 429a20-21). He argues instead that if
nous were mixed with the body, there would be some property or other
which nous would necessarily encode in all of its operations. This would
hinder its operations, rendering it incapable of thinking all things.
Crucial to Brentano's understanding of the passage, therefore, is the
claim that there is no one domain of properties every act of intellectual
cognition necessarily encodes. By contrast, every operation of aisthêsis
necessarily encodes some feature its peculiar object exemplifies (DA 418all-15,
424al7-27). Every sense operation occurs by the action of a peculiar object, an
idion, on a sense organ. Thus, every act of seeing involves the faculty of
sight's being affected by some color, every act of hearing involves the faculty
of hearing's being affected by some sound, and so forth. Moreover, each act of
sensation involves a mean between excesses, a situation which prevents the
sense from perceiving things exemplifying properties of the mean (DA 424a210). As Aristotle maintains:
For this reason we do not perceive anything which is equally as
hot or cold <as the sense organ>, or <as> hard or soft, but rather
excesses of these, since perception is a sort of mean between the
opposites present in objects of perception.. .And just as that
which is to perceive white and black must be neither of them in
actuality, although both of them in potentiality (and so too for
the other senses), so in the case of touch, that which is to
perceive must be neither hot nor cold (DA 424a2-9).
Here Aristotle suggests that the senses have blind spots. If nous is similar,
perhaps it too has blind spots. Since it thinks all things, nous must be the case
that it does not encode any property in virtue of its operation as such. For
then too it would be blind to objects exemplifying that property.
Brentano's explanation of Aristotle's motivation for regarding nous as
unmixed with the body is unpersuasive .20 He seems to argue that if nous
encodes a given property necessarily in all of its operations, then it, like sense
perception, would fail to apprehend any object which exemplified that

20For a more sympathetic appraisal, see George (1978,252).

property .21 Here there are two problems. First, it is not the case that what
encodes F-ness cannot also represent what exemplifies F-ness. A bust of
Aristogeiton encodes the property having mass; it also exemplifies this
property; and it also represents what exemplifies this property. Although a
representation need not, and typically will not, exemplify what it represents
as exemplifying, it may. In order to show that there is something which nous
could not think if it necessarily encoded some property in all of its operations,
Brentano would need to establish the strong thesis that if something encodes
F-ness, it cannot also represent what exemplifies F-ness. Since a
representation may do this by itself exemplifying F-ness, or indeed by
necessarily encoding what it happens on an occasion to represent as
exemplifying, Brentano cannot establish this stronger thesis.
Moreover, it is necessary to recall what motivates Aristotle's point
about limitation on the range of aisthêta which are perceptible by aisthêsis .
The examples which seem to support his contention evidently do not turn on
whether a given sense organ necessarily encodes the property its idia
exemplify insofar as they are idia. Rather, the examples suggest that if a given
organ exemplifies a property it should come to encode, then there will be no
way for it to be affected by the aisthêton in question. Consequently, the point
seems essentially to turn on Aristotle's conviction that sensation is a paschein
ti. Although something representing what is black can both encode and
exemplify something black, nothing exemplifying black can be made to
become black in the sense of being made to come to exemplify blackness. For
what is black cannot change into what is black. Even so, something
exemplifying, e.g., grey, can be made to come to represent something which
exemplifies grey by being made to come to encode greyness. Thus, if a brain
were in fact grey, it might come to encode the greyness of a grey cat by
whatever system of representation it employs. Hence, to the degree that
Aristotle's contentions about perceptual blind spots are justifiable, this must
be due to the fact that the sense organs exemplify certain properties
21 Perhaps Brentano is not always consistent on this point. I am here focusing on his
discussion in (1874/1973), and agreeing in broad outline with George's (1978)
reconstruction of his argument. Brentano (1867/1977) does not agree in all
particulars with the later work, and in some places seems to lapse into circularity
(see esp. 1867/1977, 77-80). Still less in accord with this picture are some of the
remarks about this subject in Brentano’s letters, as recounted by Spiegelberg (1978).

(including, e.g., certain temperature properties) and therefore cannot be made
to come to exemplify those properties by an aisthêton which exemplifies
them.
If this is correct, Brentano's contention that an embodied nous would
necessarily encode some property in all its operations, in effect that there
would be some idion for nous just as there is for perception, does not provide
any warrant for Aristotle's claim that nous is unmixed with the body. For
something could be mixed with body and still satisfy the demands for
representational plasticity required to think all things. Since what
exemplifies F-ness can come to encode F-ness, just as what encodes F-ness can
exemplify F-ness, Aristotle's point does not seem to turn on the objectdirectedness of nous together with a thesis about the lack of an idion for nous.
Therefore, Brentano's account of De Anima 429a fails to provide any warrant
for Aristotle's striking thesis that nous is unmixed with the body.
V. Isomorphism in Intentionally
Although ultimately unconvinced by his account of Aristotle, I am in
general sympathy with Brentano's approach. In particular, I am sympathetic
to the suggestion that intentional features of intellectual cognition help
explain Aristotle’s contention that nous is unmixed with the body, and
therefore unlike the aisthêtikon in some important respects.
What are these features? Initially, Brentano formulated a three-part
thesis of intentionality: (i) all and only mental phenomena make reference to
or are directed upon an object; (ii) no physical phenomenon makes (intrinsic)
reference to or is directed upon an object; and (iii) the objects upon which
mental phenomena are directed occupy a strained ontological position insofar
as they have "intentional inexistence”. Brentano came to reject (iii), and was
severely criticized by Husserl for the broad scope of (i).22 Others have attacked
his peculiarly narrow conception of an object as an individual particular.23
Purged of these somewhat idiosyncratic features introduced by the early
Brentano, the thesis of intentionality becomes: (i) only mental phenomena

22Husserl (1900/1970). See also Bealer (1993) and Zalta (1990).
23Bealer (1993).

make reference to or are directed upon a object;24 and (ii) no purely physical
phenomenon is directed upon or makes reference to an object. For brevity's
sake, I will refer to the thesis of intentionality as the thesis that only non
physical, mental phenomena are about things.
Following Brentano, we may speak of the problem of intentionality in
our context as Aristotle's thesis of intentionality (on the basis of, e.g., Meta.
1074b35). Still, some caution is required here. First, when we speak of the
problem of intentionality, we usually have in mind a nest of distinct but
related problems beginning but not ending with the simple question of
whether either or both parts of the thesis of intentionality turn out to be true.
More often, philosophers have wanted to determine whether, if (i) is true,
one can provide an analysis of the aboutness of the mental, or whether it
must be accepted as a primitive thesis about the mental.25 Most often today,
philosophers are concerned especially with the question of whether, if (i) is
true, (ii) is also true, that is, whether there is a reductive or physicalistically
adequate account of the aboutness of mental phenomena.26
Some of these concerns are clearly not Aristotle's. In particular, he
displays no interest in the question of whether a physicalistically adequate
account of the aboutness relation can be developed. Even so, this does not
entail that he has no interest in offering an account of aboutness or in relying
on the aboutness of the mental in analyzing noêsis. As I understand his
method in the De Anima, Aristotle wants to provide an account of the
intentional feature of noetic states in terms of their being isomorphic with
their object.27

24i here leave unaddressed the question of whether all mental phenomena are
intentional in character. This question turns partly on the breadth of the notion of
object we are prepared to tolerate.
25see esp. Chisholm (1957), Bealer (1993), Parsons (1982), and Zalta (1988).
See Schiffer (1987). Some philosophers simply presume from the outset that no
reductive analysis of intentionality, physicalistic or otherwise, is possible. Searle
(1983, 26) provides a good example: "In my view it is not possible to give a logical
analysis of the Intentionality of the mental. . . There is no neutral standpoint from
which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and the world and
then describe them in non-Intentionalistic terms. Any explanation of
Intentionality, therefore, takes place within the circle of Intentional terms."
27See n. 2 above.

One passage in particular is relevant here. In De Anima iii 4, Aristotle
maintains:
Now, if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being
affected in some way by the object of thought or something else of
this sort. It must then be unaffected, but capable of receiving the
form, and potentially such as it, but not identical with it (DA
429al3-16).
Here Aristotle simply draws out one of the features of the analogy with
aisthêsis he accepts. Just as perception consists in the reception of perceptible
forms (DA 424al7-27), so thinking consists in the reception of intelligible
forms.
In committing himself to this feature of the analogy between aisthêsis
and noêsis, Aristotle adopts a thesis of isomorphism:
(I) The mind is one in form with its objects.
In accepting (I), Aristotle does not yet accept any more substantive thesis that
a given state of mind is about an object by being isomorphic with it. Nor does
he issue any general claim to the effect that aboutness as such is to be analyzed
in terms of isomorphism. Nonetheless, we have the general claim that when
S thinks o, where o can be a particular individual in Brentano's sense or a
more structured composite semantic unit, S's doing so is to be explained by a
formal state of S which S shares with o.
Now, when asserting that nous must be receptive of a form (dektikon
tou eidous), Aristotle's contention is crucially ambiguous, between a stronger
and a weaker hypothesis. He argues that nous and its objects are one in form.
Or rather, he claims that "the actuality of that which is sensed (tou aisthêtou)
and sensation is one and the same" (DA 425b26). Given the terms of the
analogy between aisthêsis and noêsis, this requires that the actuality of the
noêton and the mind are one and the same. This in turn suggest a
surprisingly strong conception of isomorphism: the form of what thinks is
numerically the same as the form of what is thought in actuality when noêsis
occurs. Aristotle seems to embrace this picture when claiming that "the soul
is, in a sense, all things which exist, for these are either perceived or thought"
(DA 431b21-2).
On this strong thesis of isomorphism, what thinks and what is thought
are isomorphic in a limiting sense of being numerically one and the same.
Most noteworthy about strong isomorphism is that it suggests an arresting
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approach to aboutness: in noêsis, a state of S is about an object o because the
form of that state is the form of that object. This is noteworthy because it
treats isomorphism as non-representational. The state of S directed upon o
does not merely represent o, but rather becomes the form of o itself.
Precisely in virtue of its arresting non-representationalism, strong
isomorphism has proven attractive to many .28 Lear, for example, suggests:
The perceptible object and the corresponding sense faculty stand to
each other as two potentialities which have a single actualization.
The perceptible object has the capacity to be perceived, the sensefaculty has the capacity to perceive. The single actualization is the
act of perceiving—and this occurs in the perceiver.. .This higherlevel actuality of sensible form can occur only in a sense faculty.
Thus the highest level of actuality of perceptible form occurs not
in the perceptible object, but in the sense faculty of a being who is
perceiving the form .29
The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of noêsis. A given object of thought
is most fully actual when cognized. The form of a frog, as Lear claims, is not
fully actual when that frog is engaging in archetypal froggy behavior, but
when it is actualized in a mind contemplating that frog. Isomorphism is
numerical identity. States of mind are about objects because they are those
objects in their highest states.
This suggests an odd, non-representational account of isomorphism,
one centrally at variance with the account Brentano offers. Perhaps one
advantage of strong isomorphism is its ability to undercut a persistent
tendency to rely on a primitive notion of similarity in explaining
isomorphism .30 This is problematic for a host of familiar reasons, including:
28See Anscombe and Geach (1961) and Kosman (1975).
29Lear (1988,103).
30Cummins (1989, 4) understands Aristotle this way: "The basic idea behind
[Aristotle’s! theory is that to know something is, in a pretty straightforward sense, to
be it. .. Your mind literally is just what the physical stuff is, because to be red and
spherical is just to be inFORMed by redness and sphericity.. .To represent the world
is to have a model of it in (on?) your mind—a model made of different stuff, as
models usually are, but a model just the sam e.. .According to this theory,
representation is evidently founded on similarity (shared properties)—a similarity,
the theorist can just see'* Cummins rightly rejects Aristotle's theory so construed. I
doubt the theory advertised is in fact Aristotle's.

(i) data structures need not resemble what they represent (the equations of
analytical geometry do not look like figures); and (ii) similarity short of exact
duplication is always to some degree perceiver relative, with the result that
similarity collapses into perceived similarity, and thus into the kind of
intentional relation it was meant to explain in the first place.31
However that might be, Aristotle himself does not endorse strong
isomorphism. In any number of passages, he limits the degree to which he is
willing to identify the forms of an informed nous and its correlative noêton.
Our first indication is the caution Aristotle exercises occurs in the very
statement of his theory: "The soul is, in a sense, all things which exist, for
these are either perceived or thought" (DA 431b21-2). The soul is in a sense
(pôs) all things, where the pôs fairly clearly indicates strong reservations
about the form of sameness envisaged (cf. DA 417b22-24, Meta. 1045b21).
Further, Aristotle makes plain that although the mind is capable of receiving
the form, it is potentially such as the form, although not identical with it (DA
429al5-16). He demonstrates similar circumspection about aisthèsis: "These
[the objects of perception] and perception are, then, the same, though they
differ with respect to being (to einai)" (DA 424a25-6). When using such
expressions as "the Fs and Gs are the same, although to einai F datis not the
same as to einai Gdat/' Aristotle usually means that even where ’F and 'G'
are extensionally equivalent, accounts of F and G differ, with the result that
being-F and being-G are not the same property. Here too Aristotle points out
that even if some aisthêton or noêton is actualized qua aisthêton or noêton
only in a certain kind of mental act, what performs the act and its object are
nevertheless numerically distinct.
This is fortunate, since otherwise Aristotle's theory would have
intolerable results. If strong isomorphism were true, then on the assumption
that two people can think the same object, your intellect could be numerically
identical with mine in contemplation. Given the transitivity of identity, if Si
thinks o, and is therefore numerically identical with o, and Sü thinks o, then
Sj and Sü will themselves be numerically identical. This is clearly not the
case.
Nonetheless, strong isomorphism was supposed to have the advantage
of non-representationalism. Representationalist interpretations of
See Cummins (1989, Ch. 3).

isomorphism (weak isomorphism) ran into difficulties of their own. Hence,
there seems to be a certain dilemma for Aristotle. Either he accepts strong or
weak isomorphism. If he accepts strong isomorphism, then he commits
himself to the absurdity that distinct minds are numerically identical. If he
accepts weak isomorphism, then he avoids that result only by embracing a
similarity theory, which is manifestly false. Hence, isomorphism is either
absurd or manifestly false.
We have seen that Aristotle rejects strong isomorphism. Does this
entail that his approach to intentionality is a non-starter? He would be
constrained to accept the second horn of this dilemma only if it could be
shown that weak isomorphism required similarity for representation. But
surely it does not. If we agree antecedently that representation can occur
without similarity, and further agree, as against strong isomorphism, that
nous is the form of its object as a discrete entity representing it, then it is open
to us to deny the purportedly unacceptable consequences of weak
isomorphism. And if we can accept weak isomorphism, we can look to a
development of isomorphism as a grounding for Aristotelian intentionality.
VI. Weak Isomorphism and th Distinctness of Nous
Reflecting on Aristotle's weak isomorphism, we may be able to come to
a deeper appreciation of his conception of the relation of nous to the body.
The argument, strictly, is an argument for the conclusion that nous is not
mixed with the body (DA 4229a24-25); it is not an argument for the claim that
nous is immaterial in any sense approximating substance dualism. The one
clear motivation for this conclusion is PR, the plasticity requirement, that
nous has no intrinsic feature capable of precluding its thinking any given
noêton. This thesis, in a suitably qualified form, may be defensible.
Consequently, Aristotle's conclusion may be both more modest and more
plausible than was initially supposed.
It may be more modest in the sense that it amounts to nothing more
than the contention that intentional phenomena are not amenable to
physicalistic analyses. That is, Aristotle accepts both parts of the thesis of
intentionality. In this sense, his claim about mixture may not be the radical
doctrine it seemed to be. He merely holds that noetic phenomena are about
things (that they have objects) and that no account of this aboutness can be
given in bodily terms. Consequently, nous will be choriston logô(i): no

account of its activities need be couched in terms of the operations of a body.
Indeed, no complete account can be given in purely physicalistic terms, since
no physicalistic analysis of aboutness can be advanced.
Although deflationary to a point, Aristotle's claim is not merely that
no such account has been provided. It is rather the stronger claim that no
such account can be given. Now, because he is, on this interpretation,
arguing for a comparatively modest thesis, Aristotle need not offer any
aggressively anti-physicalistic argument. Still, even the modest conclusion is
strong enough.
The resources of weak isomorphism provide the following approach.
Nous satisfies PR, the plasticity requirement, at least in the sense that there is
an infinite number of things nous can think. Each instance of noêsis
involves a paschein ti, a suffering something, or a being affected in a certain
way—or at any rate a being affected after a fashion. This being affected may be
either a change from potentiality to a first actuality, in learning, or a change
from first to second actuality, when a thinker moves from dispositionally to
occurrently knowing p. In either case, a certain change is effected. When a
thinker suffers something in the sense of changing from potentially knowing
p to actually knowing p (so, to acquiring p as a first actuality), weak
isomorphism entails that that thinker acquires a new structure. If that
thinker's nous is already structured, it will be precluded from coming to
acquire the structure of the noêton whose structure it already has. Moreover,
if it is actually structured in a permanent way, then nous will be
compositionally rigid rather than compositionally plastic.
Now, Aristotle presumes that if nous is mixed with the body it will
necessarily be structured in a certain way. More precisely, he thinks that if
nous is the actuality of a body, it will be in actuality, and hence will be so
structured that for some noêton, it will already be weakly isomorphic with
that noêton. Since that noêton could not, consequently, cause it to be affected
in such a way that it will acquire its structure, nous will be cognitively blind
relative to that noêton. If it is blind to some noêton, nous cannot think all
things; there will be some noêton to which nous will in principle be
precluded from standing in intentional relations. Is so, nous will not satisfy
PR, and so will not think all things.
In sum, Aristotle seems to have two non-equivalent motivations. On
the analogy with aisthêsis, we expect nous to have an epistemic blind spot if it
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is the actuality of a body. If it is the form of a certain body, then it will be
actually structured in a definite way. If it is structured in a definite way, then
nous cannot be made to acquire the structure it already has, and so cannot be
affected, even in an attenuated way. That is, nous cannot be made to come to
exemplify its own structure.
Here there are two worries. First, if this is Aristotle's point, the
argument ultimately rests on a remarkably thin observation. Aristotle means
to point out that if nous is structured, there will be one form it cannot
acquire. It will therefore not become that form. Yet if it has that form, it is
not clear why it will need to become it in order to think the noëton whose
form it is.32 Even waiving that, and granting that there is one thought to
which nous would be epistemically blind in virtue of its constitution, it may
be thought odd to suppose that PR is so secure that we can rely on it to infer
that nous cannot be so constituted. For, it is hard to see what principle
Aristotle could offer in support of PR which would not implicitly appeal to
the immateriality of nous itself, and hence land him in an unsatisfactory
circularity.
Presumably Aristotle might want to respond that if nous is the actual
structure of a body, its own intrinsic structure not only renders it blind to the
noêton with which it is isomorphic, but also precludes its receiving other
structures. Here PR may seem to go well beyond the analogy with perception
by adding another premise. The premise is this: if F is actually structured,
then it cannot take on another structure. Yet this is clearly false as regards
first actualities., where this seems to be the appropriate level of noetic
acquisition (DA 417bl-16). If on the other hand, we understand Aristotle to
mean that what is actually contemplating cannot contemplate all things, then
his locution is most odd: we should expect him to say directly that what is
actually contemplating cannot contemplate more than one thing. We should
then be surprised to read that nous can think all things. For surely the point
would then be not that nous can think all things, but that it cannot think of
more than one thing at an instant. Hence, it may seem difficult to discern
any promising systematic argument for the incorporeality of nous, even in
the less ambitious sense mentioned.
32still, this at least helps explain the otherwise perplexing and ill-motivated aporta
about nous coming to think itself at DA 429b26.

Still, there is perhaps one way of developing PR such that it really does
provide á good reason for endorsing the second half of the thesis of
intentionality, that no purely physical phenomenon is directed upon or
makes reference to an object. (This would be the thesis of irreducibility.) PR
holds that nous can think all things. This does not state or entail that nous
can adopt an infinite, or even uncountably finite, number of attitudes toward
noëta. Aristotle frequently enough recognizes various attitudes nous is
capable of adopting (in DA iii 4 these include ginoskein, phronein,
dianoeisthai, and hupolambanein). If there is no non-intentional way of
analyzing intentionality as such (that is, if the first part of the thesis of
intentionality is true), then the only way to provide a physicalistically
reductive account of intentionality would be to provide individual analyses
of each of these states seriatim, and then to try to string them together in
some form of "disjunctive" analysis.
Even if we permit disjunctive analyses count as proper analyses, as I
doubt we should, the plasticity of the mental renders it highly unlikely that
anyone could determine that they had listed and analyzed the last possible
type of intentional attitude. Any claim to have found the last intentional
attitude would ring hollow ring in the extreme, because such a contention
would pretend to have provided a complete, exhaustive taxonomy of all the
logically possible types of intentional attitude.
If he wants to argue this way, Aristotle presumes a strong but justifiable
principle of plasticity. Wedding this to a principle of weak isomorphism as a
component in a non-reductive approach to the intentionality, Aristotle may
conclude first that it is not necessary to mention the body in an account of
noêsis, and then more strongly that any account mentioning a body will miss
the mark of the mental. We may think that Aristotle overemphasizes PR in
offering this argument. Perhaps, but each time we offer a physicalistic
analysis of intentionality, something foreign interposes itself, and somehow
hinders and wards off our effort.
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